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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
R.A.CHEL P. LlTNT, and 
DILWORTH STRASSER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
GEORGE W. KITCHENS, ALBION 
L. KITCHENS, and MINNIE E. 
KITCHENS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7871 
This was an action to quiet title to a driveway 10 feet 
wide and 99 feet deep across the prop·erty of appellants 
at 418 East Fourth 'South, Salt Lake City, Utah, claimed 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
by the respondents, their neighbors to the west, residing 
at 414 East Fourth South. Respondents filed a counter-
claim asserting right to the driveway. The complaint 
was resolved against the appellants and the counterclaim 
in favor of the respondents by the Honorable Clarence 
E. Baker, Judge of the Third District Court. 
The cornplaint alleged that appellants own land 
with 3 rods frontage and 10 rods depth, which land was 
particularly described but which is the property at 418 
East Fourth South. The complaint alleged that defend-
ants claim a right of way over the west 10 feet of the 
north 99 feet of that property in connection with their 
adjoining land. 
In the answer the respondents admit ownership of 
the plaintiff, admit claiming the right of way and deny 
that it is without right and then by way of counterclaim 
allege that respondents are the owners of the lot imme-
diately west of the land of appellants. Respondents allege 
that they are the owners "of a right of way across the 
premises of the plaintiff for the purpose of passing 
over the same with or without horses, wagons, auto-
mobiles, trucks and other vehicles, and in any and all 
other reasonable manner and for ingress to and egress 
from the p,remise.s of the .defendant above described, 
which said easement and right of way has been used 
by the defendants and their predecessors in interest 
openly, adversely, continuously and uninterruptedly for 
a period of more than 35 \years last past, and the same 
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is appurtenant to the said above described prPinises 
O\vned by the defendants as aforesaid," (R. 3-4). The 
counterclaiu1 then alleges that the appellants threaten 
to obstruct the easement and right of way of the defend-
ants and that the claim is wrongful. The respondents 
pray for adjudication of their easen1ent and right of 
way as n1entioned and that the land of the appellants 
be held subservient to the said easement and that appel-
lants be enjoined fro1n interfering with the right of 
\Yay, (R. 4-5). 
At the opening of the case the question was raised 
whether the claim of respondents was by deed or p-re-
scription. Respondents stated that the claim was by 
prescription only, (R. 9-10). 
Witness Dilworth Strasser testified for the appel-
lants and offered in evidenc_e Exhibits A, B, and C. 
Exhibit A, an abstract of title, shows the property in 
appellants, Fred E. Weidner and Bessie Evelyn F'ergu-
son. Exhibit B is the deed from those owners to Ada 
C. Pace, dated October 8, 1950; and Exhibit C, a deed 
to the appellant Strasser. The witness testified that he 
was buying the property from Rachel P. Lunt and upon 
this showing the appellants rested. 
In opening their case, respondents offered in evi-
dence Exhibit 1 which is an abstract consisting of 34 
pages. Appellants objected only to Page 30, a quit claim 
deed of the right of way, which page was received tenta-
tively (R. 13). Page 24 of Exhibit 1 is a warranty 
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deed to Willie Ann Kitchens, a widow and the mother 
of all of the respondents, dated in 1920, of the property 
at 414 East Fourth South which deed includes a right 
of way described as follows: 
"Together with a right of way for foot pas-
sengers over the following tract: 
Beginning 84' 2" East from the Northwest 
corner of said Lot 5, and running thence South 
68'; thence West 1' 4"; thence North 68'; thence 
East 1' 4", to beginning. 
Together with a right of way over the fol-
lowing: 
Beginning at a point 84' 2" East from· the 
Northwest corner of said Lot 5, and running 
thence South 68'; thence East 1' 4"; North 68'; 
thence West 1' 4", to the place ·of beginning for 
foot passengers." 
Exhibit 1 shows on Page 31 the warranty deed from 
Willie Ann Kitchens to her five children. Willie Dee 
Kitchens and Homer Nelson Kitchens subsequently con-
veyed their interests to the respondent, George W. 
Kitchens, as shown at Pages 33 and 34. The abstract 
also includes a quit claim deed dated May 15, 1936, and 
recorded May 18, 1936, from Carrie E. Weidner to Willie 
Ann Kitchens describing the right of way in dispute. 
The pictures, Exhibits 3, E, and G, are taken of the 
properties involved and show the property of appellants 
as the house on the left, and the property of respond-
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ents as th~ house on the right, and drive way running 
south fron1 Fourth South Street bet"Teen the two houses. 
Exhibit 2 is taken from near the southea8t corner of the 
house belonging to respondents and shows the woodshed 
on the left of the house and son1e distance south of the 
propert~~ and that there is an open space between the 
house and the 'voodshed. This is likewise shown by 
Exhibit F 'Yhich is looking north from the woodshed 
on the property of respondents and shows the house of 
respondents. 
The respondent, George W. Kitchens, testified he is 
a Ya owner of the property at 414 East F'Ourth South, 
and that the other respondents are also part owners, (R. 
14). He testified that he has been acquainted with the 
property since 1920 when it was purchased by his 
mother, Mrs. Willie Ann Kitchens, (R. 15). When he 
first drove to the property in 1920 he parked his car 
on the property of appellants part way down the right 
of way, (R. 18). Afterward he and his brother fre-
quently drove down the right of way in going to their 
mother's home, and the coal company used the driveway 
for delivering coal and wood as there was no other 
way to deliver to the woodshed, (R. 22). Pedestrians 
walked down the driveway to the rear of the property 
of respondents, (R. 22), and in those days there was a 
fence on the east side of their property about 3 feet 
east of the houseline which fence ran south to the coal 
shed through which there was a gate just at the coal 
house, (R. 22-23). This gate was 4¥2 feet wide and for 
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pedestrians only, (R. 23). There was and is a window 
on the east side of the coal shed through which coal was 
thrown when coal was delivered; (R. 24). Exhibit 2 
shows the property as in 1920, (R. 24). The driveway 
was used by the mother of respondents and the family 
for parking cars, for the delivery of wood and groceries, 
for every purpose that served the house from 1920 down 
to the present time, (R. 27). Mrs. Carrie E. Weidner 
was the next-door neighbor, (R. 27). She and her hus-
band resided there and owned the property when the 
Kitchenses first moved into their property. The two 
families visited back and forth, outside and inside the 
houses, back yard and in the front yard more or less 
constantly, (R. 28), and on a half-dozen occasions George 
Kitchens was with the Weidners when deliveries were 
made into the Kitchens property and neither Mr. nor 
Mrs. Weidner ever objected to- use of the driveway and 
there was never any objection made to the use of the 
driveway until 1946 when some people who rented the 
property of appellants built a gate between the two 
houses and across the driveway, (R. 29). This gate was 
remove·d by respondent George W. Kitchens and the 
driveway has been used ever since ·without objection, 
there having been no interruption from 1920 until the 
gate was placed in 1946, (R. 29-30). The_ fence extending 
along the east boundary of respondent's property as far 
south as the coal shed was in place until up to the year 
1946 when he tore-it down, (R.c 31). The driveway was 
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repaired and kept up by the family of respondents by 
placing ashes on it, filling n1ud holes and water holes 
and sn1oothing it down, but it \vas used more by the 
Kitchenses than by the \v"""eidners, (R. 31). He never 
sa".,. the ,, .... eidners repair the drive,vay, (R. 32). 
On cross examination ~Ir. Kitchens testified that he 
did not inspect the property at 41-± East Fourth South 
prior to its purchase by his n1other and that when he 
first saw it about 30 days later there 'vas a fence from 
the southeast corner of the house to the coal shed, ( R. 
33), with a door on the north of the coal shed and a kind 
of window on the east side, and that the coal shed was 
no longer used for storing coal for heating but only for 
the coal stove in the kitchen (R. 34). There was a gate 
in the fence right next to the coal shed, ( R. 34). There 
was and is a sidewalk to the west of the house of respond-
ents that goes along the west side of the house and turns 
east at the back to the back door. The shortest route 
from the sidewalk to the back door was along this side-
walk and into the back door, since to reach the back 
door across the back way required a pedestrian to go to 
the south end of the fence and through the gate and then 
back across the yard to reach the back door, (R. 35). 
There is also a woodshed on the prop,erty of respond-
ents located west of the coal shed and being of approx-
imately the same size, (R. 35). The woodshed could not 
be reached from the driveway and to unload materials 
from a wagon it could be carried through the gate at 
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the back or from. the front along the west ·walk and into 
the wood shed, (R. 35.:.36). The witness never saw coal 
or wood delive·red into the back by bringing it in bags 
or bundles along the sidewalk west of the house, (R. 36). 
He remembered no gate placed across the driveway prior 
to 1946 and no gate in 1932. He tore down the- fence on 
his own property and the gate placed across the drive-
way by the tenant at separate times which might have 
been two or three days apart in 1946, (R. 37-38). The 
gate was across the driveway two or three days. Mr. 
Evans put it up one day and Kitchens took it down the 
next, (R. 39). He denied ever having an argument with 
one of the tenants concerning the parking of cars in the 
back of the property of appellant, (R. 39). 
George W. Kitchens further testified that he owns 
two houses on F·ourth 'South west of the property of 
respondents and two houses on Fourth East going south 
from Fourth South and that he plans to operate the 
entire group· of houses as a motel and that there is no 
means of getting an automobile off the streets except 
through the driveway between the properties of respond-
ents and appellants, (R. 40). 
"Q. Is it your intention, if you are successful in 
establishing a right-of-way between 414 and 
418 to park cars in back of 414 for the benefit 
of all the Motel~ 
A. For any use necessary. 
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Q. In eonnertion \Yith that ~Iotel '~ 
.. ...\... ~-lnything that is neeessary. 
Q. ,, ... elL by that you n1ean, necessary 1n con-
nection 'vith any of those properties J? 
... \.. If anything is neeessary, I would use it like 
I al"~ays haYe. 
Q. Your contention is you have absolute right-
of-\Yay for any purpose you desire to put the 
property to? 
~\.. Yes. 
Q. Including the building of garages on your 
property)? 
~-\... Yes. 
Q. And using this driveway as a means of ac-
cess~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What do you base that claim on~ 
A. I own the land on both sides of it, and cer-
tainly if I have used that right-of-way for 
forty years, I can do what I please on my own 
side of the property." (R. 40-41). 
When his mother purchased the property in 1920, 
the driveway was in use, it gave the appearance of 
vehicles having been driven down it and people having 
walked down it. No new driveway was made and they 
simply added some use to an existing driveway which 
had. been there for a long time, (R. 42). The Kitchens 
family put ashes in the driveway more or less all the 
time and no one ever complained about it, (R. 43). The 
use of the driveway by the Kitchens family didn't make 
the driveway wider, longer, or deeper; it didn't require 
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the moving of any buildings, trees, or shrubs and they 
used the driveway just as they found it, (R. 44). 
George W. Kitchens is buying the other two-thirds 
( 2;3) interest in the property from his brother and sister, 
the other respondents, and has the entire property under · 
contract, (R. 45). He is a shoe salesman at Z.C.M.I (R. 
45-46). He also owns a motel at 3007 S·outh State Street, 
besides the 1notel on Fourth South and Fourth East, 
(R. 46). 
Mrs. Minnie Kitchens Packard testified that she is 
one of the defendants. She was living with her mother 
when the property at 414 East Fourth South was pur-
chased by her mother. She went with her several times 
to look at the property, (R. 47). There was a driveway 
at that time between the two properties, its use was 
ap·parently well established, this was spring of the year 
and the driveway was muddy, (R. 48). There was a 
fence on the east side of her mother's property which 
began at the north side of the house about three feet 
east of it and extended back to the little gate next to 
the coal house, (R. 49). She lived with her mother at 
that time for about two years. The driveway was used 
for coal, wood, and as a driveway for them and their 
friends, (R. 49). The use of the driveway was not inter-
rupted until the fence was put up in 1946. There was a 
very friendly relationship between the two families and 
they parked their cars on the Weidner property with 
the Weidn~rs' permission, (R. 50). The Weidners made 
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no objection ""'hen th~ l(itehens ears used the drive,vay 
in their presence, (R. 50). 
:Jirs. Packard further testified that the l(itchens 
frunily neYer had exclusiYe use of the driveway (R. 51), 
and that the usual 'Yay into the Kitchens ho1ne in con-
nection "~ith a. ear "~as through the driveway between the 
two houses and that so1neone in her family has had a 
car all the time during the past thirty years. She has· 
had one herself since 1923, (R. 51). The Kitchens family 
used to put ashes in the driYe,Yay to cover up the mud 
holes during the winter and rainy weather, (R. 52). 
She took the pictures 'vhich are Exhibits .2 and 3 in 
19-!7, (R,. 52). Xeither ~Ir. nor Mrs. Weidner ever told 
~Irs. Kitchens in the presence of Mrs. Packard that the 
Kitchens family should not use the driveway or that they 
had no right to use the drive\vay and never until that 
gate was put across the driveway did anyone·ever ques-
tion the Kitchenses' right to use the driveway, (R. 54). 
On cross examination Mrs. Packard testified that the 
pictures that she took could have been taken in 1949 and 
she knows that they were taken after her mother's death 
which was in 1946, (R. 55-56). She lived in the Kitchens 
property about eight months out of each year until1946, 
(R. 58). It was the practice of her mother to call Mrs. 
Weidner to the telephone which she did very frequently, 
and her mother and Mrs. Weidner were very friendly 
and visited back and forth all of the time using the little 
gateway by the coal shed, (R. 59). There was no agree-
ment between l\1rs. Kitchens and Mrs. Weidner that the 
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Kitchenses could use the driveway in exchange for the 
W eidners' use of the Kitchenses' telephone, (R. 59). The 
gate by the coal shed was in the fence before the Kitchen-
ses moved on the property and Mr. Weidner repaired the 
gate once after the Kitchenses moved in when the gate 
was falling off its hinges, (R. 60). There was never a 
gate across the driveway except the one in controversy 
which was put up in the year 1946. 
The defendants hereupon rested their case on the 
counterclaim and a!ppellants moved to dismiss the coun-
terclaim on the ground that no prescriptive right had 
been shown. The testimony showed an uninterrupted 
use for the necessary prescriptive period but no adverse 
use and the testimony shows that the use made was with 
permission, and that Mr. Weidner repaired the ·gate. 
There never was any obj.ection made untill946, (R. 65). 
This motion was denied by the Court, (R. 65). 
In behalf of appellants Rachel Petty Lunt, one of the 
plaintiffs, testified that in the months of October and 
November, 1946, there was a fence betw.een the Kitchens 
property and the disputed driveway which fence ran 
clear back to the barn or coal shed, (R. 68). That fence 
was taken down during the year 1947 or .1948, (R. 69). 
She and Mr. Howell, attorney for the Kitchense.s, went 
to the property together and inspected the driveway 
fence. When she purchased the property she had an 
attorney examine the abstract which pointed that there 
was a deed concerning a right of way on record, but that 
in his opinion the deed was of no value, (R. 71). 
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Clarence J an1es EYnns testified in behalf of appel-
lants that he lived in the property at 418 East Fourth 
South for seven years fro1n 1D-11 to late 1946 or 1947, 
(R. 7-1-7 5). ,,~hile he lived there the occupants at 414 
East Fourth ·south "~ere ~Irs. Tanner and ~Irs. l(itchen:--~, 
'vho \Yas the n1other of ~frs. Tanner, and an elderly 
woman. ~Irs. Tanner pnssed a"~ay \Yhile he lived in the 
home, (R. 7 5). He has seen 1\Irs. Packard but ·is not 
acquainted with her although he believes he has seen her 
visit there, (R. 75-76). George Kitchens visited the 
Kitchens home whjle Evans was living in 418. He didn't 
visit ver~~ often and ~Irs. Packard didn't visit very often, 
(R. 76). When ~Irs. Packard would visit she wouid 
drive her automobile in and ask Mr. Evans if she could 
park in the driveway and he gave her permission to do 
so, (R. 76). ~Ir. Kitchens also occasionally drove in 
the driveway to the gate and Evans never made any 
objection as it wasn't hurting them, (R. 77). He left a 
car or two in the back of the property where Mr. Evans 
lived and he and Mr. Kitchens had a little argument 
abqut it and Evans told Kitchens to put the car out or 
he would call the cops ; whereupon Mr. Kitchens moved 
the cars out and never again parked in the driveway 
north of the south line of the woodshed, (R. 77). While 
he lived there Mr. Weidner put a fence up in April or 
May of 1946, and it stayed there quite a while, maybe 
three months. He believes it was George Kitchens and 
his son who took the fence down while Evans was on 
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a fishing trip (R.~78-79). When Evans moved away from 
the property, the fence running from the Kitchens house 
to the coal shed was still up, (R. 79). 
On cross examination Mr. Evans t~stified that he 
gave Mrs. Packard permission to leave her car in the 
driveway and never objected when a coal truck used the 
driveway, (R. 81-82). 
Mr. Fred E. Weidner testified in behalf of appel-
lants that he was a son of Carrie E. Weidner who owned 
the property at 418 East Fourth South, and that he 
acquired an interest in the property pursuant to war-
ranty deed shown at page 16 of Exhibit A, (R. 83). 
When he executed the deed, which is Exhibit B, convey-
ing the property to Mrs. Pace, he didn't know that the 
owners of the property at 414 East Fourth S.outh claimed 
a right of way, (R. 84). He visited the property fre-
quently from 1920 to 1946 and lived in the property 
for three months in 1932, just after the death of his 
father. There was very little use of the driveway but 
there was one load of coal delivered down the driveway. 
lie used the driveway himself and his use was never 
interfered with. He made no objection to the carrying 
of a load of coal down the driveway, (R. 85). While he 
lived there in 1932 there· was a gate across the driveway 
about three feet south of the house. The gate had a little 
catch ·on it and was standing when he moved away in 
April, 1932, (R. 86). He once called Mrs. Kitchens on 
the phone and asked if she would call his mother to the 
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phone ns he hated to bother her. ~rrs. Kitchens said, 
"Oh, don't think about that, you let us use your driveway 
and that is in payment of the telephone calls." This 
conversation 'Yas prior to the death of Mrs. Weidner 
in 1939, (R. 86). He had the gate put up in April of 
1946 but doesn't kno"'" exactly where it was placed or how 
long it stood, (R. S7). For two years after Mrs. Kitchens 
moved in -!1-! East Fourth South she had coal and wood 
carried in from the street and after that they were 
permitted to use the driveway and so far as he knows 
no objection was made to that, (R. 87). The gate in 
the Kitchens fence just north of the coal shed was put 
in by Mr. Weidner's father two or three years after 
the Kitchenses moved in, (R. 88). 
On cross examination Mr. Fred E. Weidner testified 
that during the months he lived in the property in 1932 
he talked to his mother about the use of the driveway, 
and was told that she had an understanding with Mrs. 
Kitchens that she could use Mrs. Kitchens' phone and 
that Mrs. Kitchens would call her to the phone for the 
use of the right of way, (R. 89). When he drove his 
car into the driveway he sometimes parked in front and 
sometunes in the driveway and sometimes in back of 
the Weidner property, (R. 91). The gate was across 
the driveway until after his father die·d and when anyone 
wanted to get a delivery in they drove in the driveway, 
opened the gate, and drove down the driveway, (R. 92). 
His mother deeded the property to him and his sister 
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in 1934 shortly after the probating of his father's estate, 
(R. 92-93). There was no consideration except moral 
consideration for this deed, (R. 93-94). 
Mrs. Rose Weidner, the wife of Fred E. Weidner, 
testified that she was well acquainted with the property 
on Fourth South and lived there for three months follow-
ing Mr. Weidner's death, (R. 94-95). She saw people 
use the driveway in connection with the Kitchens family 
and at one time a plumber came in and removed the 
gate and stayed there until she had to ask him to move 
for some reason and he backed his wagon out, but there 
was no objection to the use of the driveway, (R. 95). 
Mr. Weidner never had the driveway without a gate 
across it. He was very particular about his back yard, 
( R. 95). She remembered the gate being there the 
morning Mr. Weidner died and she could hear Mrs. 
Weidner sobbing in the kitchen and she couldn't unlock 
the lock on the gate. She remembers it well after he 
died and when they had renters in there the gate was 
across so the babies couldn't go out into the street. 
There were never any disputes with the Kitchenses 
about the gate that she remembers (R. 95-96). 
Mrs. Bessie Evelyn F'erguson testified on behalf of 
appellants that she is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. 
William Weidner and lived in the property at 418 East 
Fourth South off and on but in either 1929 or 1930 
lived there for six months until she and her husband 
could get in their own home, (R. 96-97). She visited 
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often 'vith her n1other on Fourth South and very seldom 
saw ~Ir. George l(itchens there. During the six Inonth8 
she lived there :\Irs. Ki tr hen~ and her n1other didri 't 
·visit very often. Once in a \Yhile they made use of the 
drive,vay and ~Irs. Kitchens had some coal brought in 
once \Yhich she re1nembers as her mother asked her if she 
would please open the gate so the coal could get in and 
" she did open the gate, (R,. 98). When ~finnie Kitchens 
went a\vay she asked Mrs. ''T eidner if she could park her 
car while she loaded it and let it stay all night and her 
mother said it would be all right, (R. 98). She never 
sa\Y pedestrians use the driveway to get to the Kitchens 
home as the)~ would drive up to the front door or· else 
use the sidewalk 'vest of the home, (R. 98-99). There 
have been many gates across the driveway, each of which 
would stay for a long time until somebody would knock 
it down then it would be put up again, and she thinks 
that there have been about five gates that she remembers, 
(R. 99). Her father put the gate in the fence between 
the driveway and Kitchens property so Minnie and Mrs. 
Kitchens could run back and forth to the Weidner home 
and it was put in after Mrs. Kitchens moved in, (R. 99). 
On cross examination Mrs. Ferguson testified that 
the Kitchenses got their coal in by using the driveway 
and that they would continually break the fence and 
Mr. Weidner would fix it up, (R. 100). 
Mr. C. B. Petty testified on behalf of appellants that 
the day before trial he took pictures which are Exhibits 
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E, F·, and G, and took some of them from across the 
street and one at the back showing the old coal bin, (R. 
102). Whereupon the appellants rested. 
Robert B. Schick testified on behalf of the respond-
ents that he has lived in Salt Lake about ten years off 
and on and he is the son of Mrs. Packard, was born at 
414 East Fourth South in 1922 and lived there about 
eight of the ten years he has lived in 'Salt Lake, (R. 103). 
He lived at 414 several times after he had moved away 
and stayed there with his grandmother. He doesn't 
recall there being a gate across the driveway, the drive-
way itself being bounded by buildings on the two pieces 
of property, (R. 104). 
On cross examination Mr. Schick testified that he 
was about five years old when he moved away from 
the Kitchens home on Fourth South (R.105). 
Mrs. Minnie Kitchens Packard was recalled by re-
spondent and testified that Exhibit 4 was in her mother's 
handwriting and that she first saw it among her mother's 
effects in the safety deposit box after her death. Signa-
ture is that of Mrs. Weidner, (R.106). 
Exhibit 4 is dated July 8, 1935, and recites that it is 
the last wishes of Carrie E. Weidner and after referring 
to a number of pieces of furniture and personal things 
states, "I also want 1frs. W. A. Kitchens to have a ten 
foot by 99 foot driv·ewa.y on West side of my lot." Both 
parties rested. 
Appellants objected to the ,proposed findings of fact 
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and conclusions of la"" and derrep on the grounds gen-
erally that tl1ey 'Yere against the evidence and that 
respondent had not sho,vn a prescriptive right and 111ore 
specifically objected to finding No. ± for the reason that 
there "~as a fence bet""een the property of the plaintiffs 
until 1946 or 1949 and there 'Yas no testimony that any 
vehicle ""as ever driYen from the right of way onto the 
I~itrhens property until after the removal of the fence; 
and further that the right of way, if granted, should 
be limited to the use that 'vas made by the Kitchens 
family and that it should either be limited to loading 
or unloading of passengers or goods or should be limited 
to uses in connection with the property at 414 East 
Fourth South for pedestrian purposes, for delivery of 
goods and for parking on the right of way with the 
permission of the appellants; or that it should be limited 
so that the use of the right of way cannot be connected 
with the use or occupancy of any property other than 
the property at 414 East Fourth South, (R. 113-114). 
Appellants filed a motion for new trial urging insuffi-
ciency of the evidence to justify the decision, and that 
the decision is contrary to law and also on the basis 
of newly discovered evidence contained in the attached 
affidavit of Eloise Bowden, (R. 117). Said affidavit 
recites that she is a daughter of Bessie Weidner F-er-
guson and a granddaughter of the Mr. and Mrs. Weidner 
who owned and lived at 418 East Fourth South for many 
years and that she lived with her grandparents in one-
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half of the house at 418 East Fourth South from April, 
1937, to the fall of 1939 and was well acquainted with 
Mrs. Kitchens and with the use of the driveway made by 
Mrs. Kitchens and her family, and that. in or about June, 
1937, Mrs. Kitchens called at the home of Mrs. Weidner 
and asked Mrs. Bowden to go with her into the grand-
mother and said to her, "I am giving your grandmother 
this dollar in front of you, Eloise, so that if anything ever 
comes up concerning the driveway you can say that I 
have paid for the use of it," and on another occasion 
just before Christmas, 1939, Mrs. Kitchens gave Mrs. 
Bowden $1.00 and asked her to give it to her grandmother 
in the hospital in payment of their agreement that $1.00 
a year be paid for the use of the right of way so that it 
wouldn't be for nothing, (R. 117). On April16, 1937, she 
and her husband had a telephone put in their home at 418 
East Fourth South and thereafter Mrs. Weidner used 
their telephone and on several occasions thereafter Mrs. 
Kitchens brought over bread "to pay for the driveway" 
as Mrs. Kitchens stated. From the period April, 1937, 
to the time Mrs. Bowden moved in 1939 the driveway 
was used by Mrs. Kitchens and her family for delivery of 
coal only except when Mrs. Kitchens' grandson was home 
on furlough and asked permission to park his car on the 
Weidner property, which permission was given, (R. 118). 
In the surn·mer of 1924 Mrs. Bowden lived with her grand-
parents, and during that summer the driveway was used 
only for making deliveries of coal. In 1933 after Mr. 
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Weidner had died, ~Irs. ''Teidner rented part of the ho1ne 
to a frunily \Yhich had n little girl and to keep her in a 
gate \Yas put across the driYe\\Tay \Yhich had a little gate 
in it so people could \Yalk through on the sidewalk and 
this gate re1nained across the drive,vay for three to six 
months, (R. 118). The trial court denied the motion for 
new trial, (R. 119). 
ST.A.TE~IENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
1. The court erred in finding any prescriptive 
easement in favor of respondents. 
(.A.). The applicable presumptions favor appellants. 
(B) The motion to dismiss the counterclaim should 
have been granted. 
(C) If appellants' evidence be believed, there was 
no acqUiescence by predecessors of appellants. 
2. The court erred in making a right of way avail-
able to respondents for use which would benefit other 
lands than the property known as 414 East Fourth South. 
3. The court erred in permitting respondents to 
drive. across the right of way onto their land where a 
fence had existed until at least 1946. 
4. The court erred in denying the motion for new 
trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERR.ED IN FINDING ANY PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENT IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS. 
It fairly appears from the evidence of respondents 
that the right of way was used by the Kitchens family 
openly and continuously for twenty years, but there is no 
evidence that this use was adverse or under claim of 
right. Respondents' testimony was that the families were 
very friendly and that in the presence of the Weidners 
the driveway was used without objection from the W eid-
ners. The W eidners used the driveway all the time and 
the use by respondents was not burdensome and did not · 
alter or extend the driveway in any way. The use was 
not adverse or under a claim that the W eidners could not 
have interfered or stopped the use that was being made. 
The real question to be decided, is, therefore, the follow-
ing: "where an existing right of way is used by a pur-
chaser of property for twenty years in a manner which 
does not interfere with its use by the owner of the land 
and does not extend the right of way in any way is a pres-
criptive easement acquired~" 
(A). THE APPLICABLE PRESUMPTIONS FAVOR AP-
PELLANTS. 
In Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070, the 
plaintiff was the owner of a small farm across which ran 
a roadway used by him and his. predecessors in interest. 
The defendant claimed an easement over the roadway 
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and established use by hin1 and his predecessors in in-_ 
terest for Inore than 20 years. The court held that the 
defendants had the burden of establishing their prescri p-
tive right ~~by clear and satisfactory evidence" and then 
said: 
~'A 20 year use alone of a 'vay is not sufficient 
to establish an easement. ~1ere use of a roadway 
opened for his o"~ purpose will be presu1ned per-
missive. An antagonistic or adverse use of a way 
cannot spring from a permissive use. A prescrip-
tive title must be acquired adversely. It cannot be 
adverse when it rests upon a license or mere neigh-
borly accommodation. Adverse user is the anti-
thesis of permissive user." 
The oldest Utah case dealing with claim to prescrip-
tive right in a roadway used by the owner of the premises 
is Harkness v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 at 293 
where the court said : 
"Where a person opens a way for the use of 
his own premises, and other persons use it also 
without causing damage, the presumption is, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, that such use 
by the latter was permissive, and not under a clain1 
of right." 
This court reaffirmed this rule in Sdrales v. Rondos, 
(Utah) 209 P. 2d 562 at 565. 
The Sdrales case arose in Salt Lake City and in-
volved the claim of an owner next to a corner property 
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to have an easement across a road way used also by the 
owner of the corner property. After discussing the rule 
of the Harkness v. Woodmansee case the court said: 
"The facts of the instant case bring it within 
the rule laid down in Harkness v. Woodmansee 
since the defendant does not contend that the 
plaintiffs and their predecessors in title did not 
use the alleyway for their own purposes. Indeed, 
the evidence clearly shows that the plaintiffs and 
their predecessors made use of the alleyway in 
receiving deliveries to their buildings and in gain-
ing access to the tin garage at the east end of the 
alleyway. 
"There is no evidence to rebut the presump-
tion arising from the facts of the instant case that 
the use of the alleyway by the defendant and his 
predecessors in title was permissive and not under 
claim of right." 
Cache Valley Banking Compan;y v. Cache Cownty 
Poultry Growers Assoc., ______ (Utah) ______ , 209 P. 2d 251 
at 255 and 256, is a strong case for the position of the 
appellants here. In that case the District court found 
that the claimant had used the disputed right of way as 
a means of ingress and egress to and from its property 
for more than 20 years and further found that there 
was no evidence of any communication either oral or 
· written between the respective owners of the two prop-
erties with respect to use. "No permission for the use 
thereof has been expressly sought and no right thereto 
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denied." lTpon this showing the court found that the 
use of the right of 'Yay 'Yas open, continuous and un-
interrupted and 'Yith a claim of adverse right and was not 
permissive and therefore gaye judg1nent for the claim-
ant and enjoined the plaintiff from interfering with that 
right. Upon appeal the Supreme Court stated the prob-
lem before it as follows : 
"If the evidence is sufficient to sustain the 
finding that the usage was adverse and with the 
claim of right on the part of the claimant and its 
predecessors and was not by permission . of the 
owner then the judgment must be affirmed other-
wise it must be· reversed." 
The Supreme Court then adverted to the rule in the 
Harkness v. Woodmansee case, and reaffirmed it, refer-
ring also to Jensen v. Gerrard and referred then to Zol-
linger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, 170 A.L.R. 
770 in which the correctness of the doctrine in the Hark-
ness case was reaffirmed although the court had held that 
the facts of the Zollinger case were different and did not 
call for application of the presumption that a use is 
permissive. The Supreme Court then st3:ted and held: 
"* * * The presumption stated in that rule 
is that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
the trier of fact is required to find that the use was 
with the permission of the owner and not under 
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a claim of right. Here all of the elements required 
to establish that presumption are present. The 
railroad company opened up this way on its own 
premises, for its own use in operating its freight 
yards, the additional use thereof by the defendants 
and its predecessors did not interfere with that 
use or damage the owner, and there is not a word 
of evidence contrary to the premise that this usage 
was with the permission of the railroad company 
and not against it under a claim of right -or ad-
verse. So under that rule defendant cannot suc-
ceed." 
Actually, this case is stronger for appellants than 
the Cache Valley Banking Company case because there 
the evidence shows no permission and no discussion of use 
between the parties whereas in the case at bar Mrs. 
Packard and Mr. Kitchens both testified that their use 
of the property was known to Mr. and Mrs. Weidner, 
(R. 29, 50), that Mr. and. l\1:rs. Weidner saw them using 
it, (R. 29, 50), and testified that on occasion specific per-
mission was given to put cars in the driveway and to use 
the driveway, (R. 50). A daughter of the Weidners on 
one occasion opened the gate so that a delivery could be 
made, (R. 98), and on another occasion Mr. Weidner re-
paired the gate by which the Kitchenses passed from 
the right of way onto their own property at the rear of 
the house, (R. 60), and Mrs. Packard asked permission 
of the tenant Mr. Evans before she parked her car in the 
driveway, (R. 76). 
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Citations from other jurisdictions probably are 
superfluous since the point hns been specifically covered 
by the Utah Supreme Court in several cases and only one 
other such case "~ill be cited: Cusi.c v. Givens, Idaho 1950, 
215 P. 2d 297. The Supreme Court of Idaho succinctly 
stated the facts and its ruling at Page 298 where it is 
stated: 
··The record shows that the road was laid out 
and established by ~Ir. Duffy, for his own use, 
prior to the sale to ~Ic~Iullen. Through the years 
following it was used by the owners and by all 
" ... ho had occasion to go to either of the adjacent 
farms, by the ditch rider, the milk trucker, hay 
buyers, and the occupants of the farn1s in their 
farming operations. This use was entirely per-
missive. Mr. Duffy made no objection. There is 
nothing in the record to indicate that any user 
claimed an adverse right. Mr. ]\forgan, a pre-
decessor of plaintiffs in the ownership and occu-
pation of the west eighty, and who farmed that 
land in 1939, 1940, and 1941, said he used it be-
cause he thought it was a public road. The plain-
tiff, Cusic himself, testified he thought it was a 
county road and that the county owned it. A pres-
criptive right cannot be acquired by such use." 
The general rules as to presumptions are thus stated 
in C. J. S. pages 736 and 737 : 
"Presumptions arising out of user. The con-
tinuous user of an easement under a claim of 
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right is presumptive evidence of ownership there-
of, as against anyone who does not show a superior 
right. While the contrary is true in some juris-
dictions, sometimes by reason of statute, the gen-
eral rule is that proof of an open, notorious, con-
tinuous and uninterrupted user for the prescrip-
tive period, without evidence to explain how it be-
gan, raises a presumption that it was adverse 
and under a claim of right, or, as is sometimes 
stated, raises a presumption of a grant, and casts 
on the owner of the servient tenement the burden 
of showing that the user was permissive or by vir-
tue of some license, indulgence, or agreement, 
inconsistent with the right claimed. The facts to 
admit of such presumption are not, however, pre-
sumed, and the presumption itself is merely prima 
facie and may be rebutted. The presumption does 
not arise where the user is shown to be permissive 
in its inception, or where it is not shown to have 
continued for the prescriptive period; nor, in the 
absence of some decisive act indicating separate 
and exclusive use, does it arise where the user is 
not inconsistent with the rights of the owner, as, 
for instance, where the user is in connection with 
that of the owner or the public or is claimed with 
respect to unoccupied, uninclosed, and unimproved 
lands, the use in such cases being presumed to be 
permissive and in subordination to the owner's 
title." 
Two Utah cases should be considered. Zollinger v. 
Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, 170 A.L.R. 770 and 
Dahnken v. Georg·e Romney & Sons Comparvy, 111 Utah 
4 71, 184 P. 2d 211. 
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In the Zollinger rase W'hirh nrose in ~ache County, 
the clailnant Zollinger sho,ved open and rontinuous use 
of a right of 'vay across the defendant's land for the pres-
criptive period of 20 years. The defendant apparently 
relied in the ·supreme Court on the rule in Harkness v. 
Woodm-ansee that tl1ere is a presumption that the use 
is permissive. The Supreme Court held that the rule. 
in the Harkness case did not apply in the Zollinger case 
because the road had not been opened by the land owner 
Frank nor had it been used by him. The Supreme Court 
said at Page 773 of 170 A.L.R.: 
··The facts of this case do not bring it within 
the above quoted rule from Harkness v. W oodrnan-
see because the evidence does not support the 
proposition that this road was opened by the land-
owner for his own use. The record shows that the 
landowner used the road only infrequently and 
then used only a portion of it." 
This distinguishes the case at bar from Zollinger v. 
Frank since there is no dispute in the testimony here that 
when Mrs. Kitchens bought the property to the west in 
1920 there was a well established and well used right of 
way to the east of the 414 property and the testimony 
'vas definite that no bushes were interfered with, the 
right of way was not extended in any way and there was 
testimony from both sides that the W eidners continued 
to use the right of way as much as they wanted to and in 
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whatever way they wanted to and that the use of it by the 
Kitchens family did not interfere with their use. 
In Dahnken v. George Romney & Sons Company the 
claimant of the right of way prevailed. But in this case 
there was no evidence whatever that Dahnken who owned 
the piece of ground in dispute ever used the right of way 
or indeed that he could use the right of way. It was 
simply an effort by the owner of the ground to foreclose 
the right of the only people who had ever used the right 
of way to continue to use it. The case is not at all similar 
to the facts in the case at bar where the right of way was 
used by the owner, was opened by the owner and was in 
full use and existence at the time the claimant first pur-
chased the property. 
(B). THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE COUNTER 
CLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED. 
Not only do the presumptions favor appellants and 
indicate that the use of the driveway was permissive, but 
the evidence of the respondents affirmatively establishes 
that Mr. and Mrs. Weidner gave permission to Mrs. Kit-
chens and her family to use the driveway. When the house 
was purchased in 1920, the driveway was in use and yet 
the only right of way contained in the deed. to Mrs. Willie 
Ann Kitchens was a pedestrian right of way along the 
west side of the house, (Exhibit A. p. 24). The window 
in the coal shed indicated that the driveway had been used 
for making deliveries of coal, (R. 34). There is no record 
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of any unpleasantness until l~l-!6, no assertion· of claim 
by the I~itchenses and "Then the driveway 'vas used in the 
presence of ~Ir. and l\lrs.. 'V eidner no objection \vns 
made, (R. 29, 50). :\Ir. \Y"eidner even repaired the gate 
to facilitate access to the drive"Tay, ( R.. 60), and l\frs. 
Packard obtained permission to park her car on the W eid-
ner property, (R. 50). The cases hold that such facts 
constitute a permissi\e, and not an adverse use. 
In Harkness r. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, referred to 
supra, the Supreme Court held that the use was permis-
sive and referred to the presumption of permissive use 
"There the facts "\Yere that the plaintiff claimed a right of 
way and filed a suit to compel removal of a building erect-
ed by the defendant on the defendant's prope:rty which 
made .use of the right of way by the plaintiff impossible. 
The use had been for Jess than twenty years and no pres-
criptive right had been acquired: as we understand it 
but the court went on to consider whether the use was 
adverse or permissive. The evidence was that the defend-
ant used the strip of land. as the means of entering the 
rear: of.· his own .building on his property and that he 
had gates on the right of way a portion of the time and 
that his tenant was accustomed to keeping a team stand-
ing on the right of way and on the defendant's properties 
and that at such times it was impossible for the plaintiff 
to use the right of way. The court held that this evidence 
showed insufficient conflict with the defendant's use to 
constitute an adverse use under claim of right and applied 
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the presumption of permissive use under such circum-
stances. 
In Jensen v. Gerrard, Utah 1935, 39 P. 2d 1070 
(supra) the court found that the owner had not lost a 
prescriptive easement to the claimant although the claim-
ant had used the right of way uninterruptedly and con-
tinuously for more than 20 years. The reason for the 
holding against the claimant was that periodically the 
owner had asked for payments or the claimant had asked 
permission to use the roadway for a specific purpose and 
there was no evidence that the claimant had asserted an 
adverse use under a claim of right for a period of 20 
years. 
In Cache Valley Bankilng CompO!Jity v. Cache County 
Poultry Growe.rs Assn. 209 P. 2d 251, (supra), the court 
found open and continuous use of a right of way for more 
than 20 years in such volume that there could be no ques-
tion that the owners of the land had notice of the use. 
The original owner had been the Utah-Idaho Central Rail-
road Company and the user of the right of way was 
originally a commission warehouse dealing in poultry 
which shipped its produce over the lines of the owner. 
The property of the claimant was purchased adjoining 
that of the railroad company at the suggestion of the 
railroad compa~y and the right of way was made avail-
hie to the shipper indicating a policy to invite the use of 
its facilities, including its right of way. There was no 
evidence of any communications either written or oral 
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eoncerning the claims of the t\vo o\\yners of the properties 
and there "~as no express pern1ission given or denied for 
use of the right of way. Under these facts the court found 
that the use \Yas permissive as it \vas presumed to be be-
cause the use by the c.lai1nant did not interfere with the 
use of the property by the railroad company. 
The applicable general rule is stated in 17 Am. Jur., 
at page 97S as follows: 
--l"Tser under an adverse claim of right is 
requisite to the acquisition of an easement by pres-
cription. The rule is well settled that use by ex-
press or implied permission or license, no matter 
how long continued, cannot ripen into an easement 
by prescription, since user as of right, as distin-
guished from permissive user, is lacking." 
Likewise in 28 C. J. S. at page 668 the general rule 
is stated as follows : 
"Where a landowner opens up a way on his 
own land for his own use and conveniel}ce, the 
mere use thereof by another, under circumstances 
which do not injure the road nor interfere with the 
owner's use of it, will not in the absence of circum-
stances indicating a claim of right be considered 
as adverse, and will not ripen into a prescriptive 
right, no matter how long continued. Where a 
space is left open by the owner for his own con-
venience the presumption ordinarily is that the 
use of such space by another, even for his own 
purpose is permissive." 
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If the use was originally permissive, the burden was 
on the respondents to show when it changed to adverse 
use. The record was that the first adverse claim was in 
1946 when, according to the testimony of George W. 
Kitchens and Minnie Kitchens Packard, a gate erected 
by the then owners was taken down. It was at about the 
same time that the fence was removed. These acts came 
too late to commence an effective prescriptive period. 
And in the absence of other evidence or adverse claim, it 
must be assumed that the permissiye use was never 
ehanged. 
It might be argued that the use became adverse at 
the time the will was written, (Exhibit 4), or the deed was 
given, (Exhibit A page 30) but the respondents didn't 
know that the will had been given until Mrs. Kitchens died 
( R. 32, 106), and at the time of the so-called deed in 1936 
Mrs. Weidner did not own the property and could not 
effectively convey it. These two documents are evidence 
of the permissive nature of the use and of abortive at-
tempts to make that use permanent. If it be assumed 
that a claim as of right was made as soon as the earliest 
of these documents was prepared, such claim would date 
from 1934 and the necessary prescriptive period has not 
run. It was knowledge of these documents which lead 
appellants to ask at the beginning of the trial whether 
respondents claimed by prescription or by de·ed, (R. 9-10). 
If the claim were by deed, the only question would be 
the validity of the deed since the necessary twenty years 
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had not run since the deed was given. That question 
'vas not determined as respondents claim by prescription. 
In Sara.ge r. Nielson. 11! Utah 22, 197 P. 2d 117, the 
claimant of the right of 'Yay "Tas successful in the district 
court in quieting an easement over the plaintiff's land and 
on appeal the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and 
remanded the case to.the district court with instructions. 
In the course of its opinion the Supreme Court said : 
"Of course, it is possible for a use which starts 
out permissive to become adverse, after which the 
prescriptive period will run. Bowers v. Gilbert, 
63 Utah 2±5, 22± P. 881; Holm v. Davis, 41 Utah 
200, 125 P. 403, 44 L.R.A. NS 89; Jensen v. Ger-
rard, Supra, 19 C.J.S. Corp. S.ec. 1210, p. 889, Note 
89. 
'~The point is, that where the use begins as 
permissive it is incumbent upon the party assert-
ing that it has afterward become adverse to show 
at what point this occurred, in order to show a 20 
yea! hostile period. This is in conformity with the 
general rule as previously announced. We are not 
justified in conjecturing as to when or if such a 
hostile period began. This does :riot conflict with 
Zollinger v. Frank, Utah, 175 P. 2d 714, 170 A.L.R. 
770." 
The court held that the trial courthad erred in quiet-
ing an easement and directed the trial court to proceed 
with determination of whether a way of necessity ex-
isted. 
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The Supreme Court recognizes this rule in Jensen v. 
Gerrard, (supra), where it first discusses the fact that 
a use must be antagonistic and not permissive in order 
to support a prescriptive right and then goes on to say at 
page 1073 of 39 Pac. 2d: 
"The use may spring by permission, and a 
prescriptive right thereafter acquired if the right 
has been used and exercised for the requisite 
period under a claim of right. If a use of the way 
is under a parol consent given by the owner of the 
servient tenement to use it as if legally conveyed, 
it is a use as of right." 
For the last proposition the court cited Holm v. 
Davis, 41 Utah 200. 
This rule is stated in 17 Am. Jur., pages 981 to 982 
as fo1lows: 
"If the use originates by permission or license 
and an easement by prescription is claimed, the 
burden of proving that the permissive use had 
ceased and that the use for the necessary period 
had been adverse under claim of right is on the 
party asserting the fact of the adverse user, and 
in case of doubt, such fact will be resolved against 
him." 
C.J.S. page 656 as follows: 
"The fact that a user is permissive in its in-
ception does not in itself prevent it from subse-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
quently becon1ing adyer8e and ripening into an 
easen1ent by prescription. If a liet1 nsee renounePs 
the authority by " .. hich he began the use and clabns 
it as his o" .. n right, and that fact is brought to the 
kno,vledge of the licensor, after "'"hich the licensee 
continues the use under such adverse clai111 exclu-
sively, continuously, and uninterruptedly for the 
full prescriptive period, the right will become ab-
solute. Nevertheless, if the use begins as a permis-
sive use it is presumed to continue as such, and in 
order to transform it into an adverse one there 
must be a distinct and positive assertion of a right 
hostile to the rights of the owner, and such asser-
tion must be brought to the attention of the owner, 
and the use continued for the full prescriptive 
period under the assertion of right, excluding the 
time under which the user was permissive * * *" 
And in any event there was no notice or effort to give 
notice to the appellants or their predecessors in interest 
that an adverse claim was being made and there must 
be such notice before a prescriptive period can commence. 
That the assertion of a claim under a void deed even 
though there has been a permissive use up to that time 
can ripen into a prescriptive easement is established 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Gerrard where 
at 39 P. 2d 1070 at page 1073 this Court said as above 
quoted: 
"If a use of the way is under a parol consent 
given by the owner of the servient tenement to 
use it as if legally conveyed it is a use as of right." 
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And it may be conceded that use of the right of way 
1 
for 20 years by the Kitchens family following the giving 
i of the deed in 1936 could result in a prescriptive easement 
1 provided only that the giving of the deed and the claim 
!Jof ownership was know~ t~ the owners of the servient 
• I tenement who are the pla1nt~ffs here . 
"The rule that a permissive user will not ripen 
into an easement by prescription does not apply 
where there has been an attempt to grant an ease-
ment which is void because of the statute of 
frauds. The claim of right which enters into ad-
verse enjoyment need not be a well-founded claim, 
and therefore, it has been held that a user under 
a contract void under the statute of frauds is a 
good claim of right on which to found a prescrip-
tive easement." 17 Am. Jur. 979. 
If the only claim of the respondents of a change from 
· a permissive to an adverse use be the tearing down of the 
I) fence and the gate in 1946 or later then it is obvious that 
no prescriptive rights can have been acquired. Likewise 
if the claim is under the 1936 deed no prescriptive rights 
have accrued. 
·~ 
Repair of the road way cannot be considered evidence 
in favor or against acquisition of a prescriptive right, as 
was stated in Zollinger v. F·rank, (supra), and also in 28 
C.J.S. page 668 where the following is stated: 
"However, in order to acquire this adverse 
character knowledge must be brought home to the 
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right. The require1nent is not satisfied by keeping 
the road in repair for the use of both parties, or 
by constructing and n1aintaining bridges on it.~, 
It, therefore~ appears that the eyidence of respond-
ents failed in an essential of proof, namely, in showing 
that the use of the driYe\Yay \Yas adverse. 
(C). IF APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE BE BELIEVED, 
THERE WAS NO ACQUIESCENCE BY PREDECESSORS OF 
APPELLANTS. 
In general the testimony of appellants confirms that 
of respondents since the relationship between the two 
families was friendly and no objection was ever made to 
use of the right of way. Both Mrs. F'red E. Weidner and 
Bessie Evelyn Ferguson testified affirmatively to render-
ing help to delivery men in using the driveway for the 
benefit of the Kitchens family, (R. 95 and 98). The chief 
differences were that appellants' witnesses testified that 
several previous gates were put across the driveway, (R. 
86, 95, and 99), that there was an agreement permitting 
Mrs. Kitchens to use the driveway, (R. 86 and 89), and the 
witness Evans testified that he had an argument with 
George W. Kitchens in which he compelled Mr. Kitchens 
to back down from his claim of right, (R. 77). This evi-
dence if it be believed, conclusively establishes that no 
claim of right was successfully asserted by respondents 
and that the judgment will fall because of that defect. 
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This evidence should be believed as it must be born 
in mind that Fred E. Weidner and Bessie Evelyn Fer~ 
guson sold their interest in the property in 1946 and had 
no interest in protecting the property against right of 
way. And the witness Evans was completely disinter-
ested in the outcome of this suit. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING A RIGHT OF WAY 
AVAILABLE TO RESPONDENTS FOR USE WHICH WOULD 
BENEFIT OTHER LANDS THAN THE PROPERTY KNOWN 
AS 414 EAST FOURTH SOUTH. 
It will be noticed that the decree does not limit use 
of this right of way, but permits respondents "in any and 
all other reasonable manner and for ingress and egress 
from the premises of the defendants" and then describes 
the right of way over a 10 foot wide strip 99 feet in depth, 
(R. 112, paragraph 2). This right of way is made appur-
tenant to the property described in paragraph 3 of the 
decree which is the property at 414 East F'ourth S.outh, 
(R. 112), and then the plaintiffs are enjoined from inter-
fering with the right of way, (R. 112 paragraph 5). Mr. 
G. W. Kitchens testified that he has purchased the inter-
ests of the other respondents, (R. 45), that he owns prop-
erty adjoining 414 East F·ourth South to the west and 
then to the south, (R. 40), and that he intends to ·operate 
all of the property as a motel, (R. 40), intending to drive 
cars used for other portions of the motel down the drive-
way and park them in the rear of 414 East Fourth South, 
(R. 40). 
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This failure of the court to restriet the right of \vay 
"~as objected to by appellants, (R,. 113 to 114 paragraph 
±). 
The general rule is that a prescriptive right shall be 
limited to the minimum use 'Yhich existed for the pres-
criptive period and for the benefit of lands which have 
been benefited during the prescriptive period. Nielson v. 
Sandberg, 105 l 1tah 93, 1-±1 Pac. 2d 696; 17 Am. Jur., on 
Easen1ents, Section 100: 95 Am. St. Rep. 325. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING RESPOND-
ENTS TO DRIVE ACROSS THE RIGHT-OF-WAY ONTO 
THEIR LAND WHERE A FENCE HAD EXISTED UNTIL AT 
LEAST 1946. 
A more difficult question is whether it would be de-
parture from the alleged prescriptive use for the Kit-
chens family at this late date to start driving vehicles 
,. 
down the right of way and across the point where a fence 
used to exist onto the back of their property. The same 
question stated differently is whether the W eidners are 
now to be deprived of the privilege of fencing the west 
side of the right of way and placing a gate across the 
right of way so as to give a private enclosure in their 
back yard which was enjoyed by them more or less con-
tinuously until 1932 and periodically since that time.· 
In Nielson v. Sandberg, (supra), this court held: 
"An easement, being a burden upon the land 
which it traverses is limited to uses for which, or 
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by which it was acquired, and to the person who 
acquired it, or for the benefit of the property for 
which it was acquired." 
This rule found further expression in Big Cotton-
wood Canyon Ditch Company v. Moyle, 109 Utah 197, 
159 P. 2d 596, where the question before the court was 
whether an easement to convey water across the servient 
owner's land which had theretofore resulted in seepage 
with beneficial advantage to the servient owners through 
stimulated growth of trees and shrubs, was such that the 
dominant owner could place a culvert and stop the seep-
age thereby depriving the servient owners of the benefit 
they had theretofore enjoyed. The court thus propounded 
the only question decided in this case: 
"Will the proposed changes by the owner of 
the easement right create a greater burden on the 
·servient tenements~" 
The court thus answered its own question: 
"The extent of the easement is determined by 
the grant, or if based upon a prescriptive right, by 
its use, and once the character of the easement has 
been fixed no material change or enlargement of 
the right acquired can be made if thereby a greater 
burden is placed on the servient estate." 
And the court held that the change.of use in that case 
would place a greater burden on the servient estate. On 
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rehearing this rule \Yas left intaet but its application in 
the rase of seepage \Yater \Yas denied for the reason that 
Utah's 'vater la'v is different from the conunon la'v \vhich 
still, however, controls the la'Y of easements. 
In ..~..\.m. Jur. on Easen1ents, at pages 973 to 974 it is 
stated: 
.. :Jioreover, to entitle a person to an ease1nent 
by prescription, he must show that he has always 
used the right claimed without change or varia-
tion. The right derived from use does not exceed 
the user in which it has its origin. * * * A claim-
ant who, within the prescriptive period, enlarges 
the use cannot, at the end of that time, claim the 
use as so enlarged." 
The law is settled that a substantial change in the use 
cannot be made during the prescriptive period and that 
the changes which do not injuriously affect the rights of 
the owner of the servient tenement will not be held to 
break the continuity of the prescriptive period. It is then 
said: 
"While a party who has increased his use of 
an easement during the prescriptive period cannot 
claim the enlarged use, a more extensive and bur-
densome use for a portion of the prescriptive peri-
od will not impair the effect of such user as has 
been continuous for the full prescriptive period, 
provided the two uses are separable, but not other-
wise, since such a mingling of uses is wholly the 
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part of the party claiming the easement. If a more 
burdensome user than that originally exercised is 
continued for the prescriptive period, an easement 
for such use may be acquired." 
In Riggs v. Springfield, (Missouri, 1939) 126 SW 2d 
1144, 122 A.L.R. 1496 at page 1503, the law was thus 
stated: 
"Necessarily, therefore, when a way is claimed 
by prescription, the character and extent of it is 
fixed and determined by the use under which it is 
gained. Any material change in its use during the 
course of the prescriptive period interrupts and 
may prevent the acquisition of the right. Wash-
burn on Easements and Servitudes, page 136, Et. 
seq. Under prescription an exclusive right of pos-
session cannot be established but only a qualified 
right for a particular purpose. Jones on Ease-
ments, Sec. 161." 
A greater burden would· be placed on this right of 
way if the Kitchenses were allowed to drive cars down 
the right of way and across onto their land in several 
different particulars: 
First: So long as the Kitchenses have been using 
the right of way, according to the testimony, they have 
used it so as not to interfere with the use thereof by the 
W eidners which means that the use would not be frequent, 
that the vehicles would move slowly, and that there could 
not be a number of vehicles in the possession or use of 
the right of way at the same time. 
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Second: Since George I~itchens plans to operate a 
motel on the entire corner it "Tould be iinpossible to deter-
mine whether the o\vner of -!1-! is using the right of way 
for himself as pern1itted or \vhether one of the tenants 
or guests of the Inotel is using the right of way contrary 
to right unless the cars are detained on the right of way. 
This would involve an additional burden which could be 
avoided by placing the fence where it was. 
Third: Hithero the ,, ... eidners enjoyed the privilege 
of an enclosed and fenced backyard \vhich is convenient 
for children as well as for privacy and might support 
additional uses not hitherto enjoyed. For the Kitchenses 
now to assert the right to remove the fence and prevent 
erection of a new fence deprives the appellants of a very 
substantial benefit. 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Whether the facts and the law will support the decree 
of the trial court is amply raised on the record without a 
new trial. The only new question raised by the motion 
for new trial is, therefore, whether the affidavit of Eloise 
Bowden, (R. 117 to 118), presented material evidence 
which might alter the result. The motion was considered 
and the affidavit was, therefo-re, accepted as newly dis-
covered evidence and it must be assumed that on a new 
trial the evidence would be produced as stated in the affi-
davit. 
The decree of the court can be upheld only upon the 
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theory that the Kitchenses used the driveway under 
claim of right and adversely to the W eidners. This re-
sult would be completely destroyed if it were shown that 
the right was permissive as to the W eidners or that the 
use was not under claim of right but by agreement with 
or license from the W eidners. The affidavit establishes 
an agreement or license between the Weidners and the 
Kitchenses for use of the driveway in exchange for use 
of the telephone, and after a telephone was installed 
shows an acknowledgement of ownership in the Weidners 
with a license to use the right of way for which license 
1\tfrs. Kitchens paid $1.00 on two different occasions and 
made gifts of bread and puddings on other occasions. 
Furthermore, the affidavit establishes the erection of a 
gate in 1933 which remained there for at least six months 
and which interrupted the use of the driveway and recom-
menced the prescriptive period as of 1933, which leaves 
insufficient time for running of the period to the date 
of commencement of the action. 
It is true that similar matters were testified to by 
Mr. and Mrs. Weidner, by Mr. Evans, and by Mrs. Fergu-
son. The court obviously did not accept the testhnony of 
these witnesses, and that can be only on the theory that 
the witnesses were not believed. It does not follow that 
Mrs. Eloise Bowden would likewise be disbelieved, and 
since her testimony, if credible, would destroy the case 
made by respondents, the motion f<;>r new trial should 
have been granted, at least to the extent of receiving the 
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testimony of ~Irs. Bowden for the effect it might have 
in the final result. 
SlT:~I~IARY AND CONCLUSION 
The evidence offered by respondents in this case fell 
far short of establishing a prescriptive right and was 
based upon the erroneous theory that by showing use for 
20 years "~ithout objection from the Weidners a right of 
\vay would be established. This could be the only theory 
upon which the trial court based its decree, unless the 
court found that some how the writing of a supposed will 
and the giving of an abortive deed gave support to the 
claim of right of way which had been permissive up to 
that time. We do not find cases or other authorities which 
support a right of way by prescription under these cir-
cumstances. 
Appellants recognize the sentimental force back of 
the suggestion that since the aged Mrs. Weidner attempt-
ed to give a quit claim deed to her friend the aged Mrs. 
l{itchen, the court should recognize that intent; but that 
ignores the position of the owners. of the land. ~fr. Fred 
E. Weidner and Mrs. Ferguson acquired the land from 
their mother in 1934, and it was for them to say whether 
a deed to the right of way should have been given gratis 
to Mrs. Kitchens in 1936. 
More accurate under the facts is the argument that 
here were the Weidners who wanted to be neighborly and 
in a friendly fashion and as a personal accommodation 
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permitted the Kitchenses to use the right of way. This 
use continued from 1920 to 1946 when a gate was erected 
for the convenience of tenants, in a manner similar to 
the erection of other gates in earlier years and with no 
intention of preventing the use of the driveway. At this 
point, however, the accommodated users had decided to 
make a claim and they not only torn down the gate but 
removed the fence which had always separated their 
property from the driveway and proceeded to use the 
driveway as though it were their own property. If this 
claim were based upon the deed, it is invalid and the clain1 
must be denied. If the claim is based upon prescription, 
it is an effort to take advantage of neighborly accommoda-
tion and occurs at the end instead of at the beginning of a 
26 year period of permissive use. No such claim was as-
serted before that. 
The motion to dismiss should have been granted up-
on the evidence produced by respondents. The applicable 
presumptions make this a permissive use of a right of 
way upon which no rights can be founded. The evidence 
of appellants, if this court believe it, showed a limited 
permission to use, based upon the erection of succe~ssive 
gates to enclose the backyard of the Weidners and an 
agreement covering use of the driveway. If confirmation 
of appellants' witnesses were needed, it is to be found 
in the affidavit of Eloise Bowden filed in support of the 
motion for new trial. 
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And beyond all these arguments, any right of way 
granted would have to be limited to use consistent with 
erection of a fence between the driveway and the prop-
erty of respondent and limited to use for the benefit of 
the Kitchens property when used as a residence and not 
as a motel. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARDS .AND BIRD, 
AND· DAN ~s. BUSHNELL, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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